THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL LAW.
J. J. BURLAMAQUI,
[1748]
COUNSELLOR OF STATE, AND LATE PROFESSOR OF NATURAL AND CIVIL LAW AT GENEVA
CHAP. V.
That man ought to square his conduct by rule; the method of finding out
this rule; and the foundations of right in general.
[I.] LET us begin with an explication of the terms. A rule, in its proper
signification, is an instrument, by means of which we draw the shortest
line from one point to another, which for this very reason is called a straight
line.
In a figurative and moral sense, a rule imports nothing else, but a principle,
or maxim, which furnishes man with a sure and concise method of attaining
to the end, he proposes.
II. The first thing we are to inquire in regard to this subject[1] is, whether
it is really agreeable to the nature of man to submit his actions to a fixt
and invariable rule? Or whether, on the contrary, he is allowed to abandon
himself indifferently to all the motions of his will, and thus to enjoy,
without either limit or impediment, the extreme facility, with which this
faculty turns itself on all sides, in consequence of its natural flexibility?
The reflections, we have given in the preceding chapters, are of themselves,
and independent of any other argument, a sufficient and convincing proof,
that the nature and constitution of man requires the establishment of some
rule. Every thing in nature has its destination and end; and consequently,
each creature is conducted to its end by a proper principle of direction.
Man, who holds a considerable rank among the beings that surround him, participates
undoubtedly of this fixt and universal order. And, whether we consider him
in himself as an intelligent and rational being, or view him as a member
of society, or whether in fine we regard him as the handy work of God, and
deriving from this first Being his faculties, state, and existence; all
these circumstances evidently indicate an end, a destination, and consequently
imply the necessity of a rule. Had man been created to live at random without
any fixt and determinate view, without knowing whither he is to direct his
course, or what road he ought to take; it is evident that his noblest faculties
would be of no manner of use to him. Wherefore, waving all disquisitions
concerning the necessity of a rule, let us endeavor rather to discover what
this rule is which alone, by enlightning the understanding, and directing
our actions to an end worthy of him, is capable of forming the order and
beauty of human life.
III. When we speak of a rule in relation to human actions, two things are
manifestly supposed; the first, that human conduct is susceptible of direction,
as we have already proved; the second, that man in all his steps and actions
proposes to himself a scope or end, which he is desirous to attain.
IV. Now let man reflect but never so little on himself, he will soon perceive,
that every thing he does is with a view of happiness, and that this is the
ultimate end he proposes in all his actions, or the last term, to which
he reduces them. This is a first truth, of which we have a continual conviction
from our internal sense. Such in effect is the nature of man, that he necessarily
loves himself; that he seeks in every thing and every where his own advantage,
and can never be diverted from this pursuit. We naturally desire, and necessarily
wish for good. This desire anticipates all our reflections, and is not in
our own election; it predominates in us, and becomes the primum mobile of
all our determinations; our hearts being never inclined towards any particular
good, but by the natural impression, which determines us to good in general.
It is not in our power to change this bent of the will, which the Creator
himself has implanted in us.
V. This system of providence extends to all beings, endowed with sense and
knowledge. Even brute animals have a like instinct; for they all love themselves,
endeavouring at self-preservation by all sorts of means, eagerly pursuing
whatever seems good or useful to them, and turning on the contrary, from
whatever appears prejudicial or bad. The same propensity shews itself in
man, not only as an instinct, but moreover as a rational inclination approved
and strengthened by reflection. Hence, whatsoever presents itself to us,
as an object proper to promote our happiness, must of necessity please us;
and every thing, that appears opposite to our felicity, becomes of course
the object of our aversion. The more we study man, the more we are convinced,
that here in reality lies the source of all our tastes; here the grand spring,
which sets us in motion.
VI. And indeed, if it be natural to every intelligent and rational being
to act always with a fixt view and determinate end, it is no less evident,
that this view or end must be ultimately reduced to himself; and consequently
to his own advantage and happiness. The desire therefore of happiness is
as essential to a man, and as inseparable from his nature, as reason itself,
for reason, as the very etymology of the word implies, is nothing more than
a calculation and account. To reason is to calculate, and to draw up an
account, after balancing every thing, in order to see on which side the
advantage lies. It would therefore imply a contradiction to suppose a rational
being, that could absolutely forego its interest, or be indifferent with
regard to its own felicity.
VII. We must therefore take care not to consider self-love and that sense
or inclination, which fixes us so strongly to our happiness, as a principle
naturally vicious, and a fruit of human depravation. This would be accusing
the Author of our existence, and converting his noblest gifts into poison.
Whatever comes from a Being supremely perfect is in itself good; and were
we to condemn the sense or inclination of self-love as bad in itself, under
a pretence that, by a misconstruction and wrong use thereof, it is the source
of an infinite number of disorders, we should for the very same motives
be obliged to condemn reason; because it is from the abuse of this faculty,
that the grossest errors and most extravagant irregularities of men proceed.
It may appear surprising to some, that we should have stopt here to investigate
and explain the truth of a principle, which one would imagine is obvious
to every body, to the learned as well as the vulgar. And yet it was absolutely
necessary; because this is a truth of the very last importance, which gives
us the key, as it were, of the human system. It is true, that all ethical
writers agree, that man is made for happiness, and naturally desires it;
(for how is it possible not to hear the voice of nature, which rises from
the very bottom of the heart?) But a great many, after acknowledging this
principle, seem to lose sight of it, and, not attending to the consequences,
that flow from it, erect their systems on different, and sometimes quite
opposite foundations.
VIII. But if it be true, that man does nothing but with a view of happiness,
it is no less certain, that reason is the only way he has to attain it.
In order to establish this second proposition or truth, we have only to
attend to the very idea of happiness, and to the notion we have of good
and evil. Happiness is that internal satisfaction of the soul which arises
from the possession of good; good is whatever is agreeable to man, for his
preservation, perfection, entertainment, and pleasure. Evil is the opposite
of good.
Man incessantly experiences, that there are some things convenient, and
others inconvenient to him; that the former are not all equally convenient,
but some more than others; in fine, that this conveniency depends, for the
most part, on the use, he knows how to make of things, and that the same
thing, which may suit him, using it after a certain manner and measure,
becomes unsuitable, when this use exceeds its limits. It is only therefore
by investigating the nature of things, as also the relations, they have
between themselves and with us, that we are capable of discovering their
fitness or disagreement with our felicity, of discerning good from evil,
of ranging every thing in its proper order, of setting a right value on
each, and of regulating consequently our researches and desires.
But is there any other method of acquiring this discernment, but by forming
just ideas of things and their relations, and by deducing from these first
ideas the consequences, that flow from them by exact and close argumentations?
Now it is reason alone, that directs all these operations. Yet this is not
all; for as, in order to arrive at happiness, it is not sufficient to form
just ideas of the nature and state of things, but it is also necessary,
that the will should be directed by those ideas and judgments in the series
of our conduct; so it is certain, that nothing but reason can communicate
and support in man the necessary strength for making a right use of liberty,
and for determining in all cases according to the light of his understanding,
in spite of all the impressions and motions that may lead him to a contrary
pursuit.
IX. Reason is therefore the only mean, in every respect, that man has left
to attain to happiness, and the principal end, for which he has received
it. All the faculties of the soul, its instincts, inclinations, and even
the passions, are relative to this end; and consequently it is this same
reason, that is capable of pointing out the true rule of human actions,
or, if you will, she herself is this primitive rule. In fact, were it not
for this faithful guide, man would lead a random life, ignorant even of
what regards himself, unacquainted with his own origin and destination,
and with the use he ought to make of whatever surrounds him; stumbling like
a blind man, at every step; lost in fine and bewildered in an inextricable
labyrinth.
X. Thus we are conducted naturally to the first idea of the word Right,
which in its most general sense, and that, to which all the particular significations
bear some relation, is nothing else but whatever reason certainly acknowledges,
as a sure and concise mean of attaining happiness, and approves as such.
This definition is the result of the principles hitherto established. In
order to be convinced of its exactness, we have only to draw these principles
together, and unite them under one prospect. In fact, since right (droit)
in its primary notion signifies whatever directs, or is well directed; since
direction supposes a scope and an end, to which we are desirous of attaining;
since the ultimate end of man is happiness; and, in fine, since he cannot
attain to happiness but by the help of reason; does it not evidently follow,
that Right in general is whatever reason approves, as a sure and concise
mean of acquiring happiness? It is likewise in consequence of these principles,
that reason, giving its approbation to itself, when it happens to be properly
cultivated, and arrived to that state of perfection, in which it knows how
to use all its discernment, bears, by way of preference or excellence, the
appellation of right reason, as being the first and surest mean of direction,
whereby man is enabled to acquire felicity.
That we may not forget any thing in the analysis of these first ideas, it
is proper to observe here, that the Latins express what we call Right by
the word jus, which properly signifies an order or precept.[2] These different
denominations undoubtedly proceeded from this, that reason seems to command
with authority whatever it avows to be a right and sure mean of promoting
our felicity. And as we have only to seek for what is right, in order to
know what reason commands us, hence the natural connection of these two
ideas arose in respect to the rules of right reason. In a word, of two ideas
naturally connected, the Latins have followed one, and we the other.
1. See Puffendorf, Law of nature and nations, book ii, chap. i.
2. Jus a jubendo; Jura enim veteres Jusa vel Jussa vocabant. Festus; jusa,
Jura.